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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s single market (in financial services) is 
still a goal rather than a fact, despite decades of more or less focused 
effort to achieve it.1 Over the years, the European Union has moved in 
the direction of achieving a single market; harmonizing rules for 
securities, banking, and insurance regulation; and developing an EU-
level infrastructure for the organization of regulatory supervision. 
But, whereas a true EU single market in financial services would 
require centralized supervision as well as some harmonized rules of 
financial regulation, the European Union as a whole has not yet 
established such a system. The establishment of the European 
Banking Union for the eurozone in November 2014 introduced a 
system of centralized supervision of banks (but not of securities, 
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1. See, e.g., Mario Mariniello, André Sapir & Alessio Terzi, The Long Road Towards the 
European Single Market, BRUEGEL WORKING PAPER 2015/1 2 (Mar. 2015) (noting that a 
“commonly held opinion among observers today is that the single market is far from being 
complete” and fragmentation of financial markets since the financial crisis). 
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insurance, or pensions markets) for a subset of EU Member States.2 
Thus, in two ways the Banking Union involves separations between 
the eurozone and the rest of the European Union’s financial markets: 
as a more intense system of financial supervision for only some of the 
EU Member States, and as a system of financial supervision focusing 
on one sector of financial activity.3 
These developments raise a fundamental and complex question 
of how a single market in financial services for the twenty-eight EU 
Member States can co-exist with a banking union for the nineteen 
members of the euro area (together with non-eurozone states which 
opt in to the European Banking Union).4 A move from a Europe in 
which all countries had their own currencies to a Europe in which a 
group of countries agreed to a common currency was originally seen 
as a move towards further integration. The Economic and Monetary 
Union was intended to be a component of the European single 
market5 in which all Member States would ultimately participate.6 
                                                                                                             
2. See, e.g., David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia., Banking Union as Holy Grail: Rebuilding 
the Single Market in Financial Services, Stabilizing Europe’s Banks and ‘Completing’ 
Economic and Monetary Union, 51(S1) J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 103 (2013). 
3. This separation between banking and other sectors of finance is less than ideal given 
that insurance, securities, and banking activity are often hard to separate and, particularly 
because of the post-crisis focus on the need for financial regulators to address the risks 
involved in shadow banking, are categorized as banking type activity carried on by entities that 
are not regulated as banks. See, e.g., Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2015, 
FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, (Nov. 12, 2015) at 1 (“Intermediating credit through non-bank 
channels can have important advantages and contributes to the financing of the real economy, 
but such channels can also become a source of systemic risk, especially when they are 
structured to perform bank-like functions (e.g. maturity and liquidity transformation, and 
leverage) and when their interconnectedness with the regular banking system is strong.”). 
4. Cf. Pia Hüttl & Dirk Schoenmaker, Should the ‘Outs’ Join the European Banking 
Union?, BRUEGEL POLICY CONTRIBUTION, Issue 2016/03 (Feb. 2016). See also, e.g. Niamh 
Moloney, European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 1609, 1612 (2014) (noting that “[i]nstitutional reform directed to executive supervisory 
governance—and primarily to the euro area—is a constitutional and political novelty”). 
5. See, e.g., Charles R. Bean, Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, 6 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 31, 32 (1992); Jean-Claude Trichet, The Euro After Two Years, 39 J. COMMON 
MKT. STUD. 1, 7 (2001) (“The euro is the crowning achievement of the single market.”). 
6. See, e.g., Regulation (EEC) No. 907/73 establishing a European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, No. L 89/2 (Apr. 3, 1973) 
(noting that “the purpose of the Fund must be to contribute to the progressive establishment of 
an Economic and Monetary Union between the Member States of the European Economic 
Community, which, in its final stage as regards its monetary aspects will have the following 
characteristics: - either the total and irreversible convertibility, at irrevocable parities, of 
Community currencies against each other, or the introduction of a common currency”). 
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By November 2015 the European Banking Union had been in 
operation for a year.7 From the time that a European Banking Union 
was proposed in 2012,8 the United Kingdom repeatedly expressed 
concern that the European Banking Union would disrupt the 
European Union’s single market in financial services9; this concern 
found new expression in the United Kingdom’s attempts to 
renegotiate the terms of its relationship with the rest of the European 
Union.10 In February 2016, the European Council reached an 
agreement on new arrangements for the United Kingdom’s 
relationship with the European Union, which included an agreement 
on financial services (“the Decision”).11 The European Council 
acknowledged that European Union “processes make possible 
different paths of integration for different Member States, allowing 
those that want to deepen integration to move ahead, whilst respecting 
the rights of those which do not want to take such a course.”12 The 
Decision stated commitments to the single market and the euro area, 
cited mutual respect and sincere co-operation between the euro-area 
and non-euro-area States, and declared: 
It is acknowledged that Member States not participating in the 
further deepening of the economic and monetary union will not 
create obstacles to but facilitate such further deepening while this 
                                                                                                             
7. Danièle Nouy: The Single Supervisory Mechanism after One Year: The State of Play 
and the Challenges Ahead, Speech by Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Supervisory Board of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism, Banca d’Italia conference Micro and Macroprudential 
Banking Supervision in the Euro Area, at the Università Cattolica, Milan, 24 Nov. 2015. 
8. Herman Van Rompuy, Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, REPORT 
BY PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (June 26, 2012). 
9. See, e.g., Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, CM 8415, 10 (July 2012) (“the Government will: continue to encourage and 
support the steps needed to ensure stability and strengthened governance in the Eurozone; 
ensure that action to tackle the crisis in the Eurozone protects the unity and integrity of the 
single market;. . . work for more effective regulation of the financial sector which ensures 
financial stability and protects UK interests”). 
10. See, e.g., The Best of Both Worlds: The United Kingdom’s Special Status in a 
Reformed European Union, HM GOVERNMENT 15 (Feb. 2016) (“The UK supports the 
Eurozone’s efforts to reform. However, as the Eurozone takes the steps it needs to succeed, it 
is equally important that the UK is not forced to participate and does not have its interests 
undermined. In the past, this has not always been clear. For example, when the Eurozone 
agreed to establish a Banking Union, the UK had to negotiate to ensure that it would not 
include the UK.”). 
11. Decision of the Heads of State or Government meeting within the European Council, 
Concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom Within the European Union, Annex I to 
European Council Conclusions, EUCO 1/16 (Feb. 19, 2016). 
12. Id. at 9. 
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process will, conversely, respect the rights and competences of 
the non-participating Member States.13 
The attempt to coordinate the requirements of protecting both the euro 
area and the single market focuses on prohibiting discrimination 
between people and firms based on currency (rather than on the basis 
of objective reasons) and on identifying the entities to be subject to 
Banking Union rules.14 A Draft Council Decision would provide for a 
Member State that does not participate in the banking union to give its 
reasoned opinion opposing the adoption of legislation by qualified 
majority, leading to additional discussion of the issue.15 
The February 2016 Decision has both political and legal 
implications. And although UK authorities have been concerned to 
emphasize that an agreement between Heads of State and 
Government is legally binding,16 it is unclear how useful its language 
is as a legally binding text  because its provisions are amenable to 
different interpretations. The language of the Decision is likely to 
influence the way in which Member States discuss policy relating to 
financial regulation. But from a legal perspective, the Decision’s 
suggestion that it should be possible to identify which potential 
European Banking Union measures would be consistent or 
                                                                                                             
13. Id. at 12. 
14. Id. at 13 (“Union law on the banking union conferring upon the European Central 
Bank, the Single Resolution Board or Union bodies exercising similar functions, authority over 
credit institutions is applicable only to credit institutions located in Member States whose 
currency is the euro or in Member States that have concluded with the European Central Bank 
a close cooperation agreement on prudential supervision, in accordance with relevant EU rules 
and subject to the requirements of group and consolidated supervision and resolution.”). 
15. Id. at Annex II (Draft Council Decision on Specific Provisions Relating to the 
Effective Management of the Banking Union and of the Consequences of Further Integration 
of the Euro Area). 
16. See, e.g., Letter from Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England, to Rt. Hon 
Andrew Tyrie MP, Chairman of the Treasury Select Committee (Mar. 7, 2016), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/treasurycommittee/other/gove
rnorletter070316.pdf at 6 (“The section on economic governance and the emergency brake are 
clearly intended by the parties to be legally binding and will enter into force upon notification 
of the UK’s intention to remain in the EU, which would be expected to occur if there is a vote 
in the referendum favour of doing so. The International Law decision is an agreement 
concluded in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and 
consequently has interpretative effect. The European Court of Justice accepts that such 
international agreements entered into by the signatories to the Treaties are instruments of 
interpretation which must be taken into account.”); The Best of Both Worlds, supra note 10, at 
8 (“All EU Member States have signed up to these principles in a decision under international 
law, giving us far greater certainty than we have ever had in the past that the UK’s rights as a 
country that does not use the euro will be respected. These principles will be incorporated into 
the Treaties when they are next revised.”). 
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inconsistent with the single market is more problematic. Does the 
single market merely prohibit the ECB from establishing barriers to 
the freedom to provide services into the euro area that would be 
prohibited to an individual Member State, or does the logic of the 
single market restrict the ability of the ECB to provide support to 
eurozone banks that allow them to compete on unequal terms with 
non-eurozone banks? The Decision addresses this issue by defining 
separate spheres of support for the euro and non-euro areas, but 
focusing on the responsibility for bearing the costs of such support 
rather than on the impact of the support on conditions of competition 
in the single market.17 The Court of Justice’s tolerance of emergency 
measures adopted by the ECB so far18 suggests that it may be willing 
to defer to the ECB when it acts to promote financial stability. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMU AND THE SINGLE MARKET 
Economic and Monetary Union (“EMU”) is a component of the 
European Union in which all of the Member States participate, 
although they do so in different ways. The Maastricht Treaty 
specified EMU as an EU goal, although the United Kingdom and 
Denmark negotiated opt-outs.19 Nevertheless the United Kingdom and 
Denmark are subject to the European Semester, the mechanism for 
coordination of economic policies of the EU Member States 
introduced in 2011.20 
Until the onset of the financial crisis the eurozone and the EU 
single market in financial services did not seem to be inconsistent 
with each other. Financial regulation was an area of the internal 
market in which the EU institutions developed harmonized rules, 
subject to subsidiarity. Some commentators suggested that this failure 
to think about financial regulation as a component of economic and 
                                                                                                             
17. Decision Concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom, supra note 11. 
18. See, e.g., Gauweiler and Others [2015] EUECJ C-62/14 (June 16, 2015). 
19. See, e.g., Rebecca Adler-Nissen, OPTING OUT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 5 (2014). 
20. See, e.g., Claire A. Dunlop & Claudio M. Radaelli, Policy Learning in the Eurozone 
Crisis: Modes, Power and Functionality, Policy Sciences (2015) DOI 10.1007/s11077-015-
9236-7. One component of the European Semester is country reports on the Member States. 
See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, EU Commission Staff Working 
Document, Country Report United Kingdom 2016, SWD (2016) 96 Final (Feb. 2016); 
Commission of the European Communities, EU Commission Staff Working Document, 
Country Report Denmark 2016, SWD (2016) 74 Final (Feb. 2016). 
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monetary union was significant and problematic,21 and others 
suggested that the ideal situation was one in which all Member States 
were also in the euro area22 (which would have had a similar effect of 
conforming financial regulation and economic governance). But 
developing coordination in the eurozone and in the context of the 
single market arguably reduced the number of barriers within the 
broader market rather than erecting new barriers.23 In 2004 the 
Commission wrote that the euro was contributing to financial market 
integration.24 The United Kingdom was content to be inside the 
(incomplete) single market yet outside the euro area.25 Commentators 
noted that in the United States, with a single currency and a national 
market there were discrepancies between economic conditions in 
different parts of the country.26 Indeed, the rationale of the single 
market is that factors of production should be able to move to the 
locations where they can be put to best use. The opening up of the 
national markets to the forces of competition would increase 
consumer welfare and inefficient, uncompetitive businesses would 
fail. However, this “creative destruction dynamic” has never operated 
fully in the European Union.27 Regulatory barriers to entry persisted 
                                                                                                             
21. See Victoria Chick & Sheila Dow, Regulation and Differences in Financial 
Institutions, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 517, 518-19 (1996) (“The question of bank supervision gets 
barely a mention in the Maastricht Treaty. It is seen as separable from the issue of monetary 
control. And yet there are plans for deposit insurance, and one hopes that the ECSB will, at 
least in extremis, be prepared to act as lender of last resort. To separate these matters is bizarre 
and irresponsible.”);  Jean Dermine, European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart before 
the Horse, 15 FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 57, 61 (2006) (“It is 
only in very special circumstances, and with unanimity in the European Council, that the ECB 
will be allowed to regulate or supervise financial institutions.”). 
22. See, e.g., Trichet, supra note 5. 
23. Although cf. Nicole Scicluna, When Failure isn’t Failure: European Union 
Constitutionalism after the Lisbon Treaty, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 441, 452 (2012) 
(“[T]he very projects that were meant to unite European citizens and promote their common 
identity, such as the euro, are now straining transnational solidarity and producing a rise in 
nationalist and protectionist sentiments.”). 
24. See, e.g., European Commission, EMU After Five Years, European Economy Special 
Report No. 1/2004, at 14 (2005). 
25. Cf. David Barr, Francis Breedon & David Miles, Life on the Outside: Economic 
Conditions and Prospects Outside Euroland, 18 ECON. POLICY 573, 601-02 (2003) (evaluating 
whether the ins or outs had done better after the introduction of the euro, but noting “no 
evidence that EMU has yet influenced financial market location, and that London’s position as 
the principal financial center in Europe appears to have been unaffected by its being outside of 
the euro zone.”). 
26. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 5. 
27. See, e.g., Mariniello et al. supra note 1, at 17. 
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over time,28 the Commission was slow to take action with respect to 
State aids,29 and the European Union had programs for regional and 
sectoral financial support—all alongside a rhetoric of 
competitiveness.30 Notably, a demand for increasing the EU’s focus 
on competition and competitiveness was part of the UK’s 
renegotiation with the European Union in 2016 and was reflected in 
the European Council’s Decision.31 
The financial crisis tended to emphasize geographic borders 
within the European Union and increase fragmentation in the EU’s 
financial markets32 as Member State Governments intervened to 
support their own financial firms.33 The Commission reacted by 
developing guidelines for the provision of State aid to financial 
institutions under stress, recognizing that crisis conditions made 
financial support inevitable.34 The crisis also led to a new focus 
                                                                                                             
28. See, e.g., Federica Mustilli & Jacques Pelkmans, Access Barriers to Services 
Markets: Mapping, Tracing, Understanding and Measuring, CEPS Special Reports No. 77 
(June 2013) at 3 (noting that the “combination of intra-EU ‘free exchange’, EU regulation and 
EU competition policy yields a market environment that is radically distinct from worldwide 
exchange. And yet, there are still barriers in the EU services markets, albeit far less than (say) 
a decade ago, let alone two decades ago.”). 
29. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Progress Report Concerning 
the Reduction and Reorientation of State Aid, COM (2002) 555 Final (Oct. 2002), at 2 (noting 
that the Stockholm European Council had in 2001 stated that the level of state aids must be 
reduced). Cf. Michael Blauberger, Of ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Subsidies: European State Aid 
Control through Soft and Hard Law, 32 W. EUR. POL. 719, 720 (2013) (noting that, in 
“balancing the general prohibition on state aid against possible exceptions, the Commission 
has always had to assess, at least implicitly, not only the effects that a certain state aid measure 
would have on competition, but also its potential contributions to other policy goals such as 
competitiveness or cohesion.”). 
30. See, e.g., Single Market Integration and Competitiveness in the EU and its Member 
States: Report 2015 (Oct. 28, 2015). 
31. Decision Concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom, supra note 11. 
32. See, e.g., Howarth & Quaglia, supra note 2, at 104-07. 
33. This development is not unique to the European Union. Generally the financial crisis 
tended to undermine the internationalization of the financial markets as states intervened to 
support domestic financial firms and sought to protect national markets from risks associated 
with foreign firms. See, e.g., Louise C. Bennetts & Arthur S. Long, The New Autarky? How 
U.S. and UK Domestic and Foreign Banking Proposals Threaten Global Growth, Cato 
Institute Policy Analysis, No. 743 (Nov. 21, 2013). Transnational policy makers’ emphasis of 
interconnectedness as a source of risk to financial stability arguably encouraged this 
balkanization. See, e.g., Nicolas Arregui, Mohamed Norat, Antonio Pancorbo & Jodi Scarlata, 
Addressing Interconnectedness: Concepts and Prudential Tools, IMF Working Paper 
WP/13/199 (Sept. 2013). 
34. See, e.g., Commission Communication on the Application, from 1 August 2013, of 
State Aid Rules to Support Measures in Favour of Banks in the Context of the Financial Crisis, 
July 30, 2013, 2013 O.J. C 216/1, at 1-2 (“The evolution of the crisis has required the 
adaptation of some provisions of the State aid framework dealing with the rescue and 
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among the G20 countries on financial stability as an objective of 
financial regulation35 (a focus which encompasses increasing numbers 
of policy issues).36 But State support of financial firms in the EU led 
to the development of a European sovereign debt crisis.37 The 
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis prompted the EU 
to act38 to preserve confidence in the financial markets,39 particularly 
to reinforce economic governance and banking regulation for the euro 
area.40 The transnational response to the financial crisis required the 
EU to conform its developing system of financial regulation to the 
transnational standards developed through the Financial Stability 
Board and transnational standard setting bodies (the Basel Committee 
for Banking Supervision, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions and the International Association of Insurance 
                                                                                                             
restructuring of firms in difficulty while not ruling out the possibility of accessing, 
exceptionally, significant public support.”). 
35. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 
2015, supra note 3.  
36. See, e.g., Communiqué, G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, , 
Washington D.C., (April 17, 2015) (“We ask the FSB to convene public- and private-sector 
participants to review how the financial sector can take account of climate-related issues.”). 
37. See, e.g., Nicholas Dorn, Regulatory Sloth and Activism in the Effervescence of 
Financial Crisis, 33 L. & POLICY 428, 428 (2011) (“In 2010 it became clear that sovereign 
states, which had ‘bailed out’ the banking sector, were themselves becoming targets of a 
mixture of speculation and genuine fears and uncertainties over their financial health.”). 
38. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Commission Work Programme 
2012: Delivering European Renewal, COM (2011) 777 Final (Nov. 2011), at 2 (“The 
European Union is confronted with the challenge of a generation. An economic challenge, that 
affects families, businesses and communities across Europe. But also a political challenge, to 
show that the European Union is equal to the task. The European Union can and should make a 
real difference to how Europeans face up to today’s crisis.”). 
39. See, e.g., Sebastian Schich, Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and Related 
Financial Safety Net Aspects, 95 FIN. MKT. TRENDS (OECD 2008/2) (noting changes to 
deposit insurance schemes in response to the crisis, including, at 91-92, proposed changes in 
the European Union). 
40. See, e.g., Jean-Claude Juncker, Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario Draghi & 
Martin Schulz, COMPLETING EUROPE’S ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (June 22, 2015) 
(Five Presidents’ Report). Cf. International Monetary Fund, Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article 
IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No.12/181 (July 2012), at 10 (“Only a convincing and 
concerted move toward a more complete EMU could arrest the decline in confidence engulfing 
the region. A credible roadmap toward a full banking union and fiscal integration will make 
the short-term crisis measures more effective. Structural reforms throughout the euro area will 
also be necessary to revive growth in the long run, while macroeconomic policies can smooth 
the needed adjustment in the short run.”). 
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Supervisors).41 But the sovereign debt crisis required a particular 
focus on the supervision of euro area banks.42 
The euro area crisis emphasized the distinctions between the 
euro area countries and the EU Member States outside the euro area. 
Solidarity between the stronger and weaker euro area countries was 
hard enough to achieve, although work on developing economic and 
monetary union since the crisis has emphasized solidarity.43 Countries 
outside the eurozone felt even less solidarity with eurozone countries 
in difficulty.44 Moreover, the reinforcement of the euro area with new 
harmonized rules of banking regulation45 and new supervisory 
arrangements46 potentially set up new barriers between the eurozone 
and the rest of the EU. Financial stability demands protecting the 
market or markets for which a policy-maker is responsible from risks 
generated elsewhere, as well as preventing the market(s) for which 
                                                                                                             
41. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence to 
International Standards (Jan. 9, 2010). The ECB and the Commission are members of the FSB. 
See Charter of the Financial Stability Board (June 2012), List of FSB Members (as amended 
on Mar. 26, 2015). 
42. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, Minimal Conditions for the 
Survival of the Euro, 51 INTERECONOMICS 24, 26 (2016) (“As the point is sometimes put, 
monetary union without banking union will not work.”); Rishi Goyal et al., A Banking Union 
for the Euro Area, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/13/01 (Feb. 13, 2013). 
43. See, e.g., Five Presidents’ Report, supra note 40, at 4 (“This common destiny 
requires solidarity in times of crisis and respect for commonly agreed rules from all 
members.”). 
44. Consider, for example, the way the UK Chancellor spoke about Greece’s problems in 
the summer of 2015. See HM Treasury Press Release, Chancellor’s Statement on Greece: 6 
July 2015 (July 6, 2015) (“Britain will be affected the longer the Greek crisis lasts, and the 
worse it gets. There is no easy way out. But even at the eleventh hour we urge the Eurozone 
leaders and Greece to find a sustainable solution.”). 
45. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 Establishing a Single Resolution 
Mechanism for the Banking Union, 2014 O.J. L 225/1. The Regulation is an internal market 
measure based on Article 114 of the TFEU, and participation in the Single Resolution 
Mechanism is open to all EU Member States, although it is specifically designed as a 
component of the European Banking Union. See also, e.g., Commission of the European 
Communities, Proposal for a Regulation Amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in Order to 
Establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, COM (2015) 586 Final (Nov. 2015). The 
proposal, which is also based on Article 114 TFEU, argues that the introduction of a eurozone 
deposit insurance scheme would benefit non-eurozone banks. Id. at 4 (“Risks would be spread 
more widely, enhancing financial stability not only in the Member State concerned but also in 
other participating and non-participating Member States, by limiting potential contagion 
effects. Moreover, it will help restore the level playing field in the internal market by limiting 
the competitive disadvantage that sound banks are suffering because of their place of 
establishment.”). 
46. See, e.g., Council Regulation 1024/2013 on Conferring Specific Tasks on the 
European Central Bank Concerning Policies Relating to the Prudential Supervision of Credit 
Institutions, 2013 O.J. L 287/63. 
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the policy-maker is responsible from being a source of risk to other 
markets. If the need to ensure financial stability within the eurozone 
were to lead to restrictions on relationships between eurozone and 
non-eurozone banks, the freedom of the non-eurozone banks to 
operate within the EU single market would be restricted. The UK 
originally tried to address this type of risk by negotiating specific 
protections for its financial markets by means of a requirement for 
double majority voting.47 
By 2016 the question of how the European Banking Union and 
the EU single market could operate together was still an issue at least 
for the UK, as it renegotiated the terms of its relationship with the EU 
and prepared for a referendum on the issue of whether the UK would 
remain in the EU or not (colloquially referred to as “Brexit”).48 From 
a political perspective, the United Kingdom’s concerns make sense, 
as the United Kingdom is the site of one of the world’s major 
financial markets and UK governments have been determined to 
ensure that EU measures relating to financial regulation should not 
harm those markets.49 
The eurozone is not the only aspect of the European Union that 
involves different Member States participating in the European Union 
on different terms in ways that may have an impact on the single 
market.50 For example, the Commission proposed a directive for 
eleven Member States to introduce a financial transactions tax after it 
became apparent that the European Union as a whole was unlikely to 
agree to such a tax.51 Denmark has opted out of some EU home 
                                                                                                             
47. See, e.g., House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Future of the 
European Union: UK Government Policy, First Report of Session 2013–14 HC 87-I , Vol. I 
(June 11, 2013) at 7. Cf. Howarth & Quaglia, supra note 2, at 114-16 (discussing 
developments leading up to agreement of the double majority voting system in the EBA). 
48. See, e.g., European Union Referendum Act 2015 c. 36; House of Lords European 
Union Committee, The EU Referendum and EU Reform, HL 122 (Mar. 30, 2016). 
49. The UK government is committed to encouraging financial activity in the United 
Kingdom. See, e,.g., Harriett Baldwin, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, in Ernst & Young, 
UK FinTech: On the Cutting Edge (Feb. 24, 2016) at 3 (“The UK Government is committed to 
supporting the development of the UK’s FinTech sector.”) Trade Groups advocate action to 
protect London as a financial centre. See, e,g, TheCityUK, Key Facts about the UK as an 
International Financial Centre Report 2015 (July 2015). 
50. See, generally, e.g., Adler-Nissen, supra note 20. 
51. Commission of the European Communities, EU Commission Proposal for a 
Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Financial Transaction Tax, 
COM (2013) 71 Final (Feb. 2013), at 3. As of early 2015, it was not clear that the eleven 
Member States would agree to the proposal. See, e.g., France Says Financial Transaction Tax 
Talks Deadlocked, Reuters Business (Mar. 10, 2016). 
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affairs legislation,52 and in a 2015 referendum the Danish people 
voted to continue this opt-out. The UK and Ireland both have a right 
to choose whether to opt in to justice and home affairs measures. 
These opt-outs have implications for regulation of the internal market 
as well as for home affairs, to the extent that the criminal law is used 
to regulate the markets. In 2014 the EU adopted a Directive on 
criminal sanctions for market abuse (insider trading and market 
manipulation); while Denmark is not subject to the Directive and the 
UK chose not to opt in (and so is also not subject to the Directive), 
Ireland chose to opt in.53 For years, commentators on the EU have 
argued about the benefits and detriments of variable geometry54 or a 
two- or more speed Europe. The Schengen Area, currently challenged 
by the EU’s refugee crisis,55 includes four EFTA countries and 
twenty-four of the EU Member States. 
Closer co-operation between some Member States of the EU in 
certain areas means that different Member States are subject to 
different rules, but the Banking Union raises greater possibilities for 
conflict with the single market than do other arrangements Although 
the UK has not opted into the EU’s requirements for criminal 
sanctions for market abuse, the UK does impose criminal sanctions 
for insider trading and market manipulation and has successfully 
prosecuted insider traders for violations of the law. But the ECB’s 
responsibility for supervising eurozone banks may lead it to 
distinguish between financial firms based in and outside the euro area 
on the basis of concerns about financial stability. Although the 
February Decision precludes discrimination based on currency, it 
does not preclude discrimination “on the basis of objective reasons.”56 
The meaning of this phrase is unclear. The Governor of the Bank of 
                                                                                                             
52. See, e.g., Denmark Votes No on Adopting EU Rules, BBC (Dec. 4, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35002158. 
53. Directive 2014/57/EU on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, 2014 O.J. L 
173/179, Recitals 29-31.  
54. See, e.g., J. A. Usher, Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles: Patterns for the 
European Union, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 243 (1997); Fabrizio Tassinari, Variable 
Geometries: Mapping Ideas, Institutions and Power in the Wider Europe, CEPS Working 
Document No. 254 (Nov. 2006).  
55. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Seventh bi-annual report on 
the functioning of the Schengen area 1 November 2014 - 30 April 2015, COM (2015) 236 
Final (May 2015); Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the State of 
Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration, 
COM (2016) 85 Final (Feb. 2016).  
56. See supra text accompanying note 14.  
1256 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1245 
England has suggested that he is happy that the February 2016 
Decision prohibits discrimination based on currency as an addition to 
existing legal restrictions on discrimination based on nationality.57 
Perhaps especially as the Chair of the Financial Stability Board,58 
Mark Carney is unlikely to be able to imagine circumstances in which 
the ECB might take action based on “objective reasons” which might 
limit the rights of a particular bank regulated by the UK financial 
regulators to be involved in financial activity in the euro area. The 
problem would arise if UK regulators took different views of the risk 
profile of a particular UK-based and regulated financial institution 
from those of the ECB where the ECB wished to limit the interactions 
of that financial institution with euro area banks. The Gauweiler 
decision59 suggests that the Court of Justice might be inclined to defer 
to the judgments of the ECB in circumstances implicating issues of 
financial stability. 
Before the establishment of the European Banking Union, the 
ECB published a Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework in July 
2011 which argued that the Eurosystem’s responsibility under Article 
127 (2) TFEU to promote the smooth operation of payment systems 
as a component of financial stability meant that “the development of 
major euro financial market infrastructures that are located outside of 
the euro area” would be a problem.60 The document stated: 
As a matter of principle, infrastructures that settle euro-
denominated payment transactions should settle these 
transactions in central bank money and be legally incorporated in 
the euro area with full managerial and operational control and 
responsibility over all core functions for processing euro 
denominated transactions, exercised from within the euro area.61 
                                                                                                             
57. See supra note 16 at 9 (“It is welcome that the Settlement reinforces the principle 
that discrimination, including on grounds of currency, is not permitted in the EU. Taken 
together with the existing Treaty prohibitions on discrimination on the grounds of nationality, 
paragraph 1 of Section A also provides protection against discrimination based on place of 
incorporation or the currency of the place of incorporation.”).  
58. Profile, Mark Carney, http://www.fsb.org/profile/mark-carney/. 
59. See supra note 18. Cf. Valia Babis, The Power to Ban Short-selling and Financial 
Stability: the Beginning of a New Era for EU Agencies?, 73 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 266, 269 (2014) 
(noting, with respect to a different decision, that “the judgment re-confirms the view that the 
Court will be very reluctant to strike down mechanisms put in place to safeguard financial 
stability, even if this means stretching the existing legal framework”).  
60. European Central Bank, Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework (July 2011) at 9.  
61. Id. at 10.  
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Exceptions to this policy would be accepted only “in very specific 
circumstances and only on a case-by-case basis.”62 In addition, 
Central Counterparties (“CCPs”) “that hold on average more than 5% 
of the aggregated daily net credit exposure of all CCPs for one of the 
main euro-denominated product categories...should be legally 
incorporated in the euro area with full managerial and operational 
control and responsibility over all core functions, exercised from 
within the euro area.”63 The UK challenged the document and in 
March 2015 the General Court held that the Policy Framework was an 
act intended to have legal effects, and thus could be challenged and, 
on the merits held that the ECB’s jurisdiction to promote the smooth 
operation of payment systems under Article 127 TFEU related to the 
payment of funds and not to securities transactions: 
a “payment system” within the meaning of Article 127(2) TFEU 
falls within the field of the transfer of funds. Therefore, whilst 
such a definition may include the “cash” leg of clearing 
operations, that is not true of the “securities” leg of the clearing 
operations of a CCP, since while such securities may be regarded 
as being the subject-matter of a transaction giving rise to the 
transfer of funds, they do not, however, in themselves constitute 
payments.64 
The ECB did not benefit from any implied power to regulate 
securities clearing systems, and if it desired such a power, it should 
ask the legislature to grant it.65 
After the judgment the ECB and the Bank of England announced 
that they had reached agreement on the exchange of information and 
cooperation with respect to UK CCPs with significant euro-
denominated business.66 The UK announced that it would therefore 
withdraw two remaining challenges to the ECB location policy.67 
Since the publication of the Eurosystem Policy Framework the 
regulation of financial market infrastructures has been a visible 
component of evolving transnational standards for financial 
                                                                                                             
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. United Kingdom v European Central Bank, Case T-496/11 (Mar. 4, 2015), ¶97.  
65. See infra ¶¶ 107-09.  
66.  Press Release, European Central Bank, European Central Bank and Bank of England 
Announce Measures to Enhance Financial Stability in Relation to Centrally Cleared Markets in 
the EU (Mar. 29, 2015).  
67. Press Release, HM Treasury, Government to Withdraw Remaining Legal Challenges 
to ECB Location Policy (Mar. 29, 2015).  
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stability,68 and within the EU CCPs regulated in one of the EU 
Member States are authorized under the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”) to provide services throughout 
the EU.69 The European Securities Markets Authority (“ESMA”) is 
working on promoting common supervisory approaches and practices 
in the application of EMIR in the EU.70 The EU has also worked with 
the US to develop a common approach for the regulation of 
transatlantic CCPs.71 To the extent that EU rules relating to CCPs are 
effectively harmonized and enforced in a consistent manner, this 
should reduce the ECB’s desire to exercise its power in this area. 
However, although the question of the extent of the ECB’s 
powers to regulate CCPs was resolved in a way that allowed for an 
accommodation between preserving financial stability in the euro area 
and the demands of an EU single market, the case does illustrate some 
of the problems that an intensified focus on financial stability in the 
eurozone poses for financial regulation and the single market in 
financial services generally. The ECB argued that the UK did not 
even have standing to challenge the Policy Framework as an actor 
outside the euro area.72 The General Court rejected this argument.73 
But more significantly, in a world in which financial stability is 
conceptualized in broad, all-encompassing terms, the ECB’s decision 
                                                                                                             
68. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial 
Regulatory Reforms, Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders (Nov. 9, 2015) at 
1 (noting that implementation of reforms of the OTC derivatives markets was progressing); 
Financial Stability Board, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms: Tenth Progress Report on 
Implementation (Nov. 4, 2015) at 1 (“International work is also underway to ensure the 
robustness and resilience of central clearing, and there are ongoing multilateral and bilateral 
discussions to address cross -border regulatory issues.”).  
69. Regulation No. 648/2012 OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade 
Repositories, O.J. L 201/1 (July 27, 2012). 
70. See, e.g., European Securities Markets Authority, Questions and Answers: 
Implementation of the Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 on OTC Derivatives, Central 
Counterparties and Trade Repositories (EMIR), ESMA/2016/242 (Feb. 4, 2016). 
71. See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, European Commission and the 
United States Commodity Futures Commission: Common Approach for Transatlantic CCPs 
(Feb. 10, 2016). 
72. United Kingdom v. European Central Bank, Case T-496/11 (Mar. 4, 2015) ¶69 (“The 
ECB contends that, even if it is concluded that the Policy Framework is a binding act, the 
United Kingdom does not have standing to bring an action against it, on the ground that it does 
not participate in certain aspects of economic and monetary union. The ECB refers, in this 
connection, to the fact that Protocol No 15 to the FEU Treaty on certain provisions relating to 
the United Kingdom excludes the application in the United Kingdom’s regard of certain 
provisions of the FEU Treaty and the Statute, including Article 127(1) to (5) TFEU.”). 
73. Id. at ¶73. 
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to deal with the implications of securities settlement systems for euro 
payment systems seems self-evident.74 The General Court’s decision 
suggests that the ECB would need to deal with such issues through 
negotiation with financial regulators outside the euro area, or seek 
new formal powers from the EU legislature, but the issues will not 
disappear entirely. The development of the Banking Union 
empowered the ECB,75 and it is not clear yet how it will use its 
powers. To some extent the separation within the ECB between 
responsibilities for financial policy and for financial supervision may 
help address these issues,76 although it is not clear conceptually to 
what extent financial stability (now recognized as an important 
component of financial regulation) can be separated from financial 
supervision. 
The Member States outside the euro area do have an interest in 
the maintenance of financial stability within the eurozone as financial 
instability originating in the eurozone could spread through the EU 
more generally. This is especially the case for the UK,77 but could 
affect other Member States outside the euro area as well. Thus, some 
actions that the ECB might take to prevent financial instability would 
be beneficial to non-eurozone EU Member States. 
The adoption of more uniform rules for the EU generally would 
be one way of addressing the issue of difference between euro and 
non-euro areas. The European Union’s financial services rules have 
already become more uniform since the financial crisis in a number of 
different ways in some cases the EU has adopted new substantively   
uniform rules, but the EU has also increased use of regulations rather 
than directives, and has allowed EU agencies to regulate some 
financial market activity directly rather than by negotiating with 
national regulators. But the idea of a single market generally, and 
with respect to financial services specifically, is one which is rather 
amorphous and difficult to specify: different stakeholders imagine the 
                                                                                                             
74. See, e.g., Andrew Large, Group of 30, Financial Stability Governance Today: A Job 
Half Done, Occasional Paper 92 (2015). 
75. See, e.g., Rachel A. Epstein & Martin Rhodes, The Political Dynamics Behind 
Europe’s New Banking Union, 39 W. EUR. POL. 415, 417-18 (2016). 
76. See, e.g., https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/organisation/decision-making/
html/index.en.html (“To prevent conflicts of interest between monetary policy and supervisory 
responsibilities, the ECB ensures a separation of objectives, decision-making processes and 
tasks. This includes strict separation of the Governing Council’s meetings.”). 
77. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 17, at 11 (noting that work on euro area financial 
stability enhances UK financial stability). 
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necessary rules for the single market in diverse ways. The next 
section of this Article considers what the EU meant by the idea of a 
single market. 
II. A SINGLE MARKET IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 
In prospect, the single market has often been characterized as 
requiring a limited set of new rules or the elimination of specific 
identified barriers.78 Harmonization of the laws of the Member States 
has been achieved to varying degrees with respect to different subject 
matters, incrementally and in piecemeal fashion. Over time the 
requirements of the European rules have changed as well as the 
relationship between European-level and national-level decision-
making and administration. Some level of regulatory harmonization is 
assumed to be necessary to facilitate the movement of factors of 
production across the geographic borders between the Member States, 
but how much harmonization or how much regulatory differentiation 
is consistent with the idea of a single market has never been 
completely clear. These issues arise in the context of negative 
integration (what rules of the Member States are permissible despite 
the Treaty freedoms of goods, persons, services and capital) and 
positive integration (what powers do the EU institutions have to 
establish harmonized rules for the internal market). In some cases the 
Court of Justice is invited to consider whether EU rules are 
impermissible infringements of the Treaty freedoms.79 
The plan to achieve a single market by the beginning of 1993 
was based on an idea of agreed minimum standards for banking, 
securities and insurance, combined with a principle of mutual 
recognition which would allow financial firms authorized in one 
Member State to do business in other Member States on the basis of 
their home State authorization.80 At the same time, EU measures to 
achieve this single market allowed host Member States to apply some 
public interest measures to financial activity within their territory.81 
                                                                                                             
78. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Commission White Paper: 
Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310 Final (June 1985). 
79. See, e.g., Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, ¶¶ 33-34; Alliance for Natural Health 
v. Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-6451, [2005] EUECJ C-154/04, ¶ 33; Inuit 
Tapiriit Kanatami v. European Commission, [2013] EUECJ T-526/10 at ¶ 33. 
80. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, 1992: The Case of Financial Services, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. 
& BUS. 124 (1991). 
81. See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, New Frontiers in EC Capital Markets Law: From Market 
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But Member States took advantage of some uncertainty about the 
extent to which EU directives permitted them to regulate banks and 
other financial firms authorized in other Member States. EU 
directives did not always apply to specific circumstances, such that 
sometimes the question fell to be considered by reference to the 
general Treaty rules on freedom of establishment.82 The Commission 
acted to try to discourage Member State regulation of the activities of 
firms from other Member States. After carrying out a consultation 
exercise, in 1997 the Commission published an interpretative 
communication that it described as providing “a reference document 
defining the legal framework within which, in the view of the 
Commission, banking activities benefiting from mutual recognition 
should be pursued.”83 
Since 1997 the EU has adopted more detailed harmonized rules 
to protect consumers of financial services, thus limiting more 
explicitly the Member States’ ability to apply their own distinct rules 
that could reduce competition in the financial markets. The Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)84 replaced the earlier 
Investment Services Directive and included new provisions for 
conduct of business rules that the home Member State was obliged to 
apply to the firms it authorized, although host States were allowed to 
supervise branches based in their territory.85 Member States were 
                                                                                                             
Construction to Market Regulation, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 809, 810 (2003). 
82. See, e.g., CaixaBank France v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de 
l’Industrie, Case C-442/02 [2004] ECR I-8961, [2004] EUECJ C-442/02; Eleanor Spaventa, 
Case C-442/02, Caixa-Bank France v. Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de 
l’Industrie., 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1151 (2005) (critiquing the decision). 
83.  Commission of the European Communities, Interpretative Communication: Freedom 
to Provide Services and the Interest of the General Good in the Second Banking Directive, 
SEC (97) 1193 Final (June 1997), at 3. 
84. Directive 2004/39/EC on Markets in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J. L 145/1 
[hereinafter MiFID]. This Directive was replaced by Directive 2014/65/EU on Markets in 
Financial Instruments, 2014 O.J. L 173/349 [hereinafter MiFID 2] and Regulation (EU) No 
600/2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments, 2014 O.J. L 173/84 [hereinafter MiFIR]. The 
difficulties of implementing MiFID 2 led the Commission to propose postponing the date for 
implementation. Commission Press Release, Commission Extends by One Year the 
Application Date for the MiFID II Package (Feb. 10, 2016). 
85. See MiFID, supra note 85, at recital 32 (“By way of derogation from the principle of 
home country authorization, supervision and enforcement of obligations in respect of the 
operation of branches, it is appropriate for the competent authority of the host Member State to 
assume responsibility for enforcing certain obligations specified in this Directive in relation to 
business conducted through a branch within the territory where the branch is located, since that 
authority is closest to the branch, and is better placed to detect and intervene in respect of 
infringements of rules governing the operations of the branch.”) and Art. 32 (7). 
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required to co-operate with each other where necessary.86 The EU has 
also adopted other specific measures designed to protect the interests 
of financial services customers.87 More harmonization reduces the 
space within which the Member States may regulate unilaterally. 
The intensity of harmonization varies between retail and 
wholesale market activity. Member States have retained the ability to 
regulate to protect consumers of financial services, although there are 
some harmonization measures in this area such as the Payment 
Accounts Directive88 and the Mortgage Credit Directive,89 a measure 
that took more than a decade to achieve.90 In 2015 the Commission 
moved towards further harmonization of the retail financial services 
market by publishing a Green Paper on retail financial services which 
emphasized the gains to be made from opening up the EU’s retail 
financial services market to more competition and cross-border 
activity: 
Retail finance provides a number of services that are essential for 
citizens: where we keep our money, how we save for our old age, 
how we pay for a house or other purchases, how we insure 
ourselves or our property against health problems or accidents. 
Developing effective Europe-wide markets for these services will 
improve choice for consumers, allow successful providers to 
offer their services throughout the EU, and support new entrants 
and innovation. But Europe-wide markets in retail financial 
services do not really exist at present. Only a small minority of 
retail financial service purchases take place across borders. There 
are many good products which exist in domestic markets, but it is 
difficult for consumers in one EU Member State to buy products 
provided in another. This does not just limit choice. Evidence 
shows that prices vary widely across the EU: for example, motor 
                                                                                                             
86. See id. art. 56. 
87. See, e.g., Directive 2014/92/EU on the Comparability of Fees Related to Payment 
Accounts, Payment Account Switching and Access to Payment Accounts with Basic Features, 
2014 O.J. L 257/214. 
88. Id. 
89. Directive 2014/17/EU on Credit Agreements for Consumers Relating to Residential 
Immovable Property, 2014 O.J. L 60/34. 
90. See, e.g., id. at recital no. 1 (“[i]n March 2003, the Commission launched a process 
of identifying and assessing the impact of barriers to the internal market for credit agreements 
relating to residential immovable property.”). 
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insurance for the same customer can be twice as expensive in 
some Member States than in others.91 
But the lack of cross-border activity involving consumers is not just 
an issue relating to financial services. Generally, there is less cross-
border consumer transacting than the Commission would like to see, 
and the Commission’s proposed solution is more regulatory 
harmonization.92 Regulatory harmonization can be described in such a 
context as being consistent with Better Regulation — one set of EU 
rules is better than multiple national rules.93 The Commission 
proposes to improve implementation, monitoring, compliance and 
enforcement with respect to EU law, which it also suggests is 
consistent with Better Regulation.94 The logical end of this sort of 
argument would seem to be complete regulatory uniformity 
throughout the EU. Complete regulatory uniformity is likely neither 
desirable95 nor achievable. The Member States have not yet agreed to 
such uniformity and are unlikely to do so. 
EU rules of financial regulation have become more detailed and 
expansive over time, increasingly limiting the discretion of the 
Member States. Where EU rules are established in directives, they 
must be implemented in the legal systems of the Member States, even 
if the Member States have in fact no or very little discretion with 
respect to implementation. Over time, the Commission has 
increasingly advocated more regulatory uniformity, rather than 
merely approximation, as necessary to achieve the single market.96 
Where directives allow the Member States to exercise discretion in 
implementation, their exercises of discretion can create disincentives 
for businesses and consumers to transact across geographic borders. 
                                                                                                             
91.  Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Retail Financial 
Services: Better Products, More Choice, and Greater Opportunities for Consumers and 
Businesses, COM (2015) 630 Final (Dec. 2015) at p. 2. 
92. Cf. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication on 
Upgrading the Single Market: More Opportunities for People and Business, COM (2015) 550 
Final (Oct. 2015) at 2 (“In many cases, one set of EU rules replaces a patchwork of 28 
different national rules, making life easier for citizens and businesses, simplifying the legal 
framework, reducing regulatory burden across the Single Market and increasing regulatory 
predictability.”). Cf. OECD, Recommendation on Consumer Protection in E-commerce (2016). 
93. Upgrading the Single Market, supra note 93. 
94. Id. at 16. 
95.  See infra text accompanying notes 127-28. 
96. See, e.g., Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal 2005 O.J. L 149/22 (noting the need for uniform rules to encourage 
cross border commerce). 
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Uniform rules are less apt to constitute barriers to cross-border trade. 
Regulatory uniformity may be expressed in directives that leave little 
discretion to the Member States, or it may be expressed in regulations 
that are directly applicable in all of the Member States without 
implementation. Sometimes the aim of uniformity may be accepted as 
an objective, but may not be achievable: differences in behavior in 
different Member States may lead the Commission to accept the need 
for stronger measures in some Member States.97 Uniform rules may 
not in fact operate uniformly if there are differences in enforcement, 
so the Commission focuses on reinforcing compliance by the Member 
States.98 
Just as harmonization of substantive rules of EU law relating to 
financial services has intensified over time, so has the EU developed 
more complex structures for the development and application of law 
in this area. In 1999 the Commission published a Financial Services 
Action Plan, which argued that the introduction of the euro created a 
new opportunity to reduce the cost of capital and benefit users of 
financial services while creating new challenges for financial 
regulators.99 The Commission proposed an “aspirational programme 
for rapid progress towards a single financial market.”100 Subsequently 
the Lamfalussy Report developed details for the implementation of 
the new plan to make financial regulation more flexible, using 
different levels of regulation so the rules could be adapted to deal 
with innovation and technological change and to improve 
implementation and enforcement of the rules in the Member States.101 
The EU institutions proceeded to put the plan into effect and adopted 
a number of new measures more expeditiously than had been the case 
with earlier financial regulation measures.102 The plan was limited in 
                                                                                                             
97. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the 
Application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, COM (2013) 138 Final (Mar. 
2013), at 6 (“The results of the investigation reveal that it would not be appropriate, for the 
time being, to remove the possibility, foreseen by the Directive, for Member States to go 
beyond the level of harmonisation set by it in these specific sectors [financial services and 
immoveable property]."). 
98. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 95. 
99. Communication of the Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the 
Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 (May 1999), at 3. 
100. Id. at 4. 
101. Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets (Feb. 15, 2001) (Lamfalussy Report). 
102. See, e.g., Commission Staff Working Document, The Application of the Lamfalussy 
Process to EU Securities Markets Legislation: A Preliminary Assessment by the Commission 
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scope as the new measures were designed to apply to trading of 
securities in regulated markets, rather than to the trading of securities 
generally.103 
During the financial crisis, the Lamfalussy committee structure 
evolved into a set of EU-level authorities.104 These new authorities 
represented an evolution of the Lamfalussy committee structure rather 
than the creation of entirely new agencies, but the new authorities had 
new powers,105 although the involvement of national regulators in 
their work does create some risks that conflicts of interest may 
interfere with decision-making.106 
The European Securities Markets Authority (“ESMA”) even 
became an EU-level regulator, first of credit rating agencies, and then 
later of trade repositories.107 ESMA also has intervention powers with 
respect to short selling.108 The UK challenged these powers, arguing 
that they constituted an impermissible delegation of authority to 
ESMA. The Court of Justice held that “the powers available to ESMA 
under Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012 are precisely delineated 
and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives 
established by the delegating authority. Accordingly, those powers 
comply with the requirements laid down in Meroni v. High 
Authority.”109 In addition, the powers conferred on ESMA to control 
short selling were “in fact to improve the conditions for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market in the financial 
                                                                                                             
Services, SEC (2004) 1459 (Nov. 15, 2004) at p. 6. The measures were a Market Abuse 
Directive, a Prospectus Directive, a Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, and a 
Transparency Directive. See Lamfalussy Report. 
103. See, e.g., Luca Enriques & Matteo Gatti, Is There a Uniform EU Securities Law 
After the Financial Services Action Plan?, 14 STAN. J. L, BUS. & FIN. 43, 53-54 (2008). 
104. See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, Reform or Revolution? The Financial Crisis, EU 
Financial Markets Law, and the European Securities and Markets Authority, 60 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 521 (2011); The da Larosiere Group, The High-Level Group on Financial 
Supervision in the EU (Feb. 25, 2009). 
105. See, e.g., Madalina Busuioc, Rule-Making by the European Financial Supervisory 
Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope, 19 EUR. L. J. 111, 112 (2013) (“While not entirely new, in 
light of their institutional predecessors, in terms of their powers however, the Authorities are 
regarded as a significant shift both within the context of EU agencification phenomenon and 
also for the regulation of financial markets.”). 
106. See, e.g., id. at 120-22. 
107. See, e.g., ESMA, ESMA’s Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies and Trade 
Repositories 2015 Annual Report and 2016 Work Plan (Feb. 5, 2016). 
108. Commission Regulation 236/2012 of Mar. 14, 2012, Short Selling and Certain 
Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, 2012 O.J.  L 86/1. 
109. United Kingdom v. European Parliament (Judgment of the Court) (2014) EUECJ 
C-270/12 (Jan. 22, 2014) ¶ 53. 
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field” and were therefore validly adopted under Art 114 TFEU.110 
Although the court’s judgment does seem to be influenced by a 
perceived need to allow ESMA to respond to situations of crisis,111 it 
represents a relatively expansive view of the role of EU agencies and 
of the scope of Article 114.112 
An additional issue of complexity within the EU’s structure of 
financial regulation is that it involves a number of sectoral agencies 
that have responsibilities with respect to different areas of financial 
regulation. The EU institutions separate out responsibilities with 
respect to insurance, banking and securities activities, although some 
of the most complex issues in financial regulation involve overlaps 
and interconnections between different sectors of finance and their 
regulation.113 The EU’s sectoral agencies do work together through a 
Joint Committee to address issues of common concern,114 just as the 
transnational standard setting bodies sometimes work together in a 
Joint Committee.115 Even closer integration of regulation across the 
sectors would likely help enhance financial stability. 
The architecture of financial services regulation in the EU has 
evolved over time in response to a perceived need for greater 
flexibility (Lamfalussy) or in response to crisis. The EU regime 
involves a mix of centralized and decentralized elements. 
Commentators have argued that the EU’s responses to the financial 
crisis led in some ways to increasing centralization, empowering the 
                                                                                                             
110. Id. at 116-17. 
111. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 108 (“It should be noted that, faced with serious threats to the 
orderly functioning and integrity of the financial markets or the stability of the financial 
system in the EU, the EU legislature sought, by Article 28 of Regulation No 236/2012, to 
provide an appropriate mechanism which would enable, as a last resort and in very specific 
circumstances, measures to be adopted throughout the EU which may take the form, where 
necessary, of decisions directed at certain participants in those markets.”). 
112. See, e.g., Babis, supra note 59, at 268 (arguing that “the Court’s wide interpretation 
creates the risk that the scope of ‘harmonisation measures’ could be expanded almost 
indefinitely, depriving Article 114 TFEU of its inherent limits, and thus stretching the 
principle of legality and the compliance of EU legislation with the principle of conferral”). 
113. See, e.g., IMF, Strengthening the International Monetary System—A Stocktaking 2 
(Feb. 22, 2016) (noting that the “build-up of financial risks, particularly in nonbank financial 
institutions, has highlighted imperfections in the oversight of the global financial system”). 
114. See, e.g., EIOPA, EBA, and ESMA, Final Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on 
Risk-Mitigation Techniques for OTC-Derivative Contracts not Cleared by a CCP under Article 
11(15) of Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 (Mar. 8, 2016). 
115. See, e.g., The Joint Forum, Developments in Credit Risk Management Across 
Sectors: Current Practices and Recommendations (June 2015). 
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ECB and the Commission.116 But in other respects centralization was 
limited by the fact that even the EU agencies, which are responsible 
for developing technical standards and administering the rules, are 
combinations of EU and national actors. The system relies on co-
operation between the EU institutions and the Member States for the 
development and implementation of policy. 
The Commission’s 2015 proposal for an EU Capital Markets 
Union117 in name seems to echo the European Banking Union, 
although it is designed for all of the Member States, rather than for 
the eurozone, and aims to encourage financing of economic activity 
through the capital markets because of weaknesses in the banking 
sector.118 The Action Plan sets out the Commission’s objective “to 
remove the barriers which stand between investors’ money and 
investment opportunities, and overcome the obstacles which prevent 
businesses from reaching investors.”119 The plan includes proposals to 
achieve “a simple, transparent and standardised securitisation market” 
in the EU.120 The Action plan also discusses crowdfunding121 and 
amendments to the EU’s prospectus rules.122 With respect to 
crowdfunding the Commission writes: 
The EU should strike a careful balance between the objectives of 
investor protection and continued expansion of crowdfunding. 
                                                                                                             
116. See, e.g., Epstein & Rhodes, supra note 75. 
117. See European Commission, Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union (Sept. 
30, 2015) (hereinafter Capital Markets Union Action Plan). Some commentators have 
suggested that the idea of a Capital Markets Union (and putting the UK Commissioner, 
Jonathan Hill, in charge of the Financial Services portfolio in the Commission) was an attempt 
to pacify the United Kingdom with respect to the Banking Union. But the Capital Markets 
Union proposals will not be firmed up by the time the UK Brexit referendum occurs. 
118. Jonathan Hill, Commissioner, Speech at the Seventh Bruges European Business 
Conference “Capital Markets Union” (Mar. 18, 2016) (“European SMEs receive 75% of their 
funding from banks. European companies are four times more reliant on banks than American 
ones. And Europeans save at least three times as much in bank accounts as they do in capital 
markets. Does this matter? Well, the crisis taught us what happens if you put all your eggs in 
one basket. As the banking sector deleveraged, the liquidity needed to keep the European 
economy growing disappeared. And companies, particularly SMEs, could no longer get the 
funding they needed to invest, to launch new products, to compete.”). 
119. Capital Markets Union Action Plan, supra note 118, at 4. 
120. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Laying down Common Rules on 
Securitisation and Creating a European Framework for Simple, Transparent and Standardised 
Securitisation, 2 (Sept. 30, 2015). See also European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation 
Amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions 
and Investment Firms (Sept. 30, 2015). 
121. Capital Markets Union Action Plan, supra note 118, at 7-8. 
122. Id. at 12. 
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Premature regulation could hamper, not foster, the growth of this 
fast-growing and innovative funding channel.123 
Thus, whereas recent developments in banking regulation have been 
driven by a need to regulate banks more strictly to ensure financial 
stability and confidence in the banking system,124 the idea of the 
Capital Markets Union is presented as being about Better Regulation 
in the sense of avoiding unnecessary regulation. When the 
Commission launched the Capital Markets Union idea it also issued a 
call for evidence on financial services regulation in the EU, inviting 
information about rules affecting the ability of the economy to finance 
itself and growth, unnecessary regulatory burdens, interactions, 
inconsistencies and gaps, and rules giving rise to unintended 
consequences.125 The Commission received 287 responses to the call 
for evidence from governmental and non-governmental organizations 
from individuals, firms and trade and consumer associations.126 
Unsurprisingly, a number of the responses agreed with the idea that 
unnecessary regulation should be avoided. 
UK actors are known for questioning whether more 
harmonization of financial regulation in the EU is indeed necessary, 
but they are not the only ones who argue for limits on harmonization. 
Subsidiarity and Better Regulation are acknowledgments of 
(indeterminate) limits on EU-level action. These questions permeate 
financial regulation,127 and rightly so, as regulatory uniformity might 
                                                                                                             
123. Id. at 7. 
124. See, e.g., Benoit Coeuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central 
Bank, From Challenges to Opportunities: Rebooting the European Financial Sector, Address at 
SZ (Süddeutsche Zeitung) Finance Day 2016 (Mar. 2, 2016) (“Clearly, the European financial 
sector is facing a profoundly changed regulatory environment after the crisis. That applies to 
quantity and quality of capital, to leverage, to funding profiles, to bail-in-able debt, to risk 
management practices. Derivatives markets and market infrastructures have also been subject 
to a comprehensive reform agenda.”). 
125. European Commission Press Release MEMO/15/5735, Call for Evidence: EU 
Regulatory Framework for Financial Services (Sept. 30, 2015).  
126. See, e.g., Call for evidence: EU regulatory framework for financial services, 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2015/financial-regulatory-framework-
review/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2016); Her Majesty’s Treasury, HM Treasury’s 
Response to EU Commission’s Call for Evidence on EU Regulatory Framework for Financial 
Services (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-treasury-response-
to-eu-commissions-call-for-evidence-on-eu-regulatory-framework-for-financial-services. 
127. See, e.g., Marta Simoncini, Legal Boundaries of European Supervisory Authorities 
in the Financial Markets: Tensions in the Development of True Regulatory Agencies, 34 Y.B. 
EUR. L. 319, 322 (2015) (noting that “the complexity of EU financial market regulations 
caught between the subsidiarity approach and the centralization of responsibilities and tasks. 
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tend to impede desirable as well as undesirable innovation. Some 
commentators advocate more harmonization in financial regulation to 
address systemic risk, others advocate more flexibility,128 and yet 
others have suggested that a mix between harmonization and 
regulatory competition might be optimal.129 
In practice, the EU’s financial markets have involved a mix of 
harmonization and regulatory competition. In some areas this mix is 
changing in ways that may raise new questions about the single 
market idea. Before the financial crisis the EU had some 
harmonization with respect to deposit guarantees for credit 
institutions, although the crisis showed that the differences between 
national systems threatened financial stability.130 Since the crisis the 
EU rules for deposit guarantees have been reformed131 and new 
deposit guarantee arrangements have been proposed for the 
eurozone.132 But even the new EU rules imagine that cross-border 
deposit guarantee schemes might emerge through merger or 
otherwise.133 
Harmonized deposit guarantee schemes, particularly schemes 
designed to achieve cross-border support of financial institutions 
based in different Member States, are complicated from the 
perspective of the single market. The idea of the single market is 
based in part on the idea that successful firms which meet consumers’ 
needs and desires for goods and services at the right level of price and 
quality should be able to succeed, and that firms that do not 
                                                                                                             
These institutional limits are fundamental to understanding the legal difficulties of integrating 
financial markets.”). 
128. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of 
Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. ON 
REGULATION 1 (2014). 
129. See, e.g., Jeanne-Mey Sun & Jacques Pelkmans, Regulatory Competition in the 
Single Market, 33 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUDIES 67 (1995). 
130. See, e.g., Howarth & Quaglia, supra note 2, at 108 (“It became evident that 
different national schemes across the EU potentially distorted level playing field competition 
and created the potential for bank runs because, in the event of financial crises, customers in 
some Member States were prone to shift deposits to a bank headquartered in those Member 
States with more generous guarantee schemes.”). 
131. Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 
2014 on Deposit Guarantee Schemes, 2014 O.J. L 173/149.  
132. See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Communication, 
Towards the Completion of the Banking Union, COM (2015) 0587 Final (Nov. 2015); 
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Proposal for a European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme, COM (2015) 0586 Final (Nov. 2015). 
133.  See supra note 132, at recital 4. 
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appropriately respond to consumers’ desires should not be insulated 
from market forces. Because of the importance of banks within the 
financial system and the need to protect bank depositors and banks 
generally from the risk of bank runs, bank regulation includes 
provision for deposit guarantees. In the period since the financial 
crisis regulators have tried to limit the moral hazard associated with 
implicit government support of banks (e.g. “too-big-to-fail”),134 and 
the European Banking Union involves a Single Resolution 
Mechanism135 to centralize the power of resolution for the eurozone. 
But deposit guarantee schemes remain an important component of 
bank regulation. Maintaining a reliable and well-financed deposit 
guarantee scheme within the eurozone would promote financial 
stability, but it would also operate as a subsidy to banks based in 
Member States that are less able than others to ensure the financing of 
a sound deposit guarantee scheme. In a true single EU financial 
market without unnecessary barriers between Member States and 
without inappropriate subsidies to uncompetitive firms, banks without 
access to reliable bank guarantee schemes might be expected to lose 
business and fail. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of ensuring that the European Banking Union does 
not undermine the EU’s single market in financial services is a 
complex one, in part because the idea of the EU's single market has 
evolved and continues to do so. The EU never had one idea of what 
the single market should be; the idea of the single market and the 
rules necessary to construct it developed over time in response to 
changing circumstances and politics. Meanwhile, financial regulation 
from a global or transnational perspective, rather than from the EU 
perspective alone, has evolved to include a focus on financial stability 
that demands that financial regulators and supervisors think about risk 
and regulation in new ways. The ECB, with an overarching 
responsibility for ensuring financial stability in the eurozone, is likely 
                                                                                                             
134. See, e.g., Financial Stability Board, Second Thematic Review on Resolution 
Regimes (Mar. 18, 2016) at 5 (noting that “only a subset of the FSB membership – primarily 
home jurisdictions of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) – has a bank resolution 
regime with a comprehensive set of powers that are broadly in line with the FSB Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions”). 
135. See supra note 45. 
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to run into issues where the demands of financial stability conflict 
with some conceptions of the single market. 
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